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HE performance ofthe British economy over the
past flveyears has been the object ofworldwide curios-
ity. Much publicity has been focused on the govern-
ment ofMargaretThatcher and her- apparently radical
departure from the policies pursued by her prede-
cessors.1 This alleged policy departure is sometimes
considered a ‘monetarist experiment.”2 Chart 1 illus-
trates some of the major macroeconomic changes in
Britain since Mrs. Thatcher’s election to Prime Minis-
ter. Inflation first rose through 1980, then fell by 1983 to
its lowest level since the mid-1960s. In contrast, unem-
ployment rose after 1979 to its highest level since the
1930s. By the end of 1983, unemployment was more
than double that following the previous worst reces-
sion 1973—75) in the postwar period.
Critics ofM~~.1~hatcher claim that these events are
primarily the result of the tight aggregate demand
(monetarist) policies of her government and, further,
that the price paid for reducing inflation has been too
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1Mrs. Thatcher came to power five years ago on May 3, 1979. She
was reelected for a second term in June 1983 and may stay in office
until June 1988 without recourse to a further general election.
2See, for example, Gould, Mills and Steward (1981), Kaldor (1982),
and Buiter and Miller (1981).
high. The purpose of this paper is to point out that this
interpretation of events is misleading.
An important feature of the changing employment
levels in Britain has been that job losses occurred almost
entirely in the manufacturing sector. In 1979, this sec-
tor provided about 28 percent of total employment.
Between the end of1978 and the end of 1982,there was
a 1.4 million rise in the number of unemployed. Over
the same period, the number- employed in manufac-
turing industries fell by 1.5 million This job loss can be
traced to asubstantial and sustained collapse ofmanu-
facturing production chart 2) between late 1979 and
the end of 1980.
Thus, anyexplanation ofunemployment’s steep rise
in Britain must be able to explain the collapse in the
manufacturing sector-, a collapse that was essentially
completed within 18 months of MN. Thatcher taking
office. Neither monetary nor- fiscal policy, alone or
taken together, has been so tight as to explain suf-
ficiently what has happened in Britain. Rather, amore
likely contributor- to unemployment comes from the
structural changes in the British economy caused by
North Sea oil production. The scenario is now widely
termed the “Dutch Disease,” so-called because of the
negative impact that Dutch oil and gas production had
on employment and output in the non-oil traded
goods sector of the Netherlands’ economy.





Before discussing the impact of North Sea oil pro-
duction on the British economy, however, it is neces-
sary to show why two other widely claimed causes —
British policies and the worldwide recession — are
inadequate explanations.
BRITAIN BEFORE THATCHER
Macroeconomic policy in the 1950s and 1960s was
dominated by the commitment to maintain a fixed
exchange rate. Fiscal policy was used to stimulate the
economy whenever there appeared to be slack; expan-
sion, on the other hand, was constrained by the bal-
ance of payments. Periodic runs on Britain’s foreign
exchange reserves led to policy reversals, causing a
budgetary cycle of expansion and contraction that
eai-ned the nickname of “stop-go.” A stable exchange
i-atewas maintained, however, for nearly two decades
(1949—67). Indeed, in retrospect, this per-iod seems like
agolden age. Inflation averaged 3 percent, unemploy-
ment aver-aged less than 2 percent and was sometimes
below 1 percent, and averagereal incomes grew about
3 percent per year.
Monetary policy in this period was subordinated to
the twin requirements of maintaining the exchange
rate and finding public sector borrowing. The main
policy instrument was the Bank of England’s discount
rate Bank Rate), though tlus was augmented per odi-
cally by quantitative ceilings on bank lending. These
ceilings weie particular’ly important following the
November 1967 devaluation of sterling until l97l.~
Heath’s “Dashfor Growth”
In mid-1970. when the Labourgovernment ofHarold
Wilson lost ageneral election to the Conservative party
31n both the 1960s and 1970s, monetary and fiscal policies were
augmented from time to time byincomes policies which attempted to
regulate the growth rateofwages. There is some evidence that these
policies temporarily restrained wage increases, but had no long-run
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led by Edward Heath, the British economy was in good
shape. Both the balance of payments and the govern-
ment budget were in surplus. Inflation (6percent) and
unemployment 2.2 percent), although high by 1960s
standards, were by no means at crisis levels — orso it
seems in retrospect.
As unemployment drifted upward through 1971,
however, the Heath government embarked upon a
stimulative macroeconomic policy known alterna-
tively as the “dash forgrowth” or the ‘Barber boom.”4
The stimulation took two for-ms. First, monetary policy
became expansionary in September- 1971 following the
introduction of a reform package known as Competi-
tion and Credit Control. ‘this program removed ceil-
ings on bank lending without replacing them with an
effective alternative control mechanism.5 As a result,
4The Chancellor of the Exchequer, chief minister in the Treasury,
during the Heath government (June 1970—February 1974) was
Anthony (later Lord) Barber, appointed July 26, 1970. 5See Hall (1983) for a detailed discussionof the scheme. Theauthor-
ities presumably thoughtthe monetary expansion would be tempo-
raryfollowing the removal ofceilings. Itproved, however, to be both
substantial and sustained.
money and credit expanded rapidly. Through 1972
and 1973, the annual growth rate of sterling M3
reached levels well in excess of 20 percent see
chart 3)”
Second, an expansionary budget was introduced in
March 1972. This largelyinvolved cuts in personal taxa-
tion, but was later augmented by a substantial expan-
sion in public sector- investment programs.
Underlying this dash for growth was the belief that
the growth of the British economy had been artificially
constrained by the fixed exchange rate br, equiva-
lently, the balance of paymnénts). In the past, restrictive
fiscal policy had tobe (ntroduced every time there was
a significant run on foreign exchange reserves.
Floating the exchange rate became acceptable, how-
ever, following the measures introduced by President
“The monetary aggregates referred to are defined as follows: Ml
notes and coins in circulation with the public + U.K. private sector
sterling sight deposits; sterling M3 Ml + private sector sterling
time deposits + public sector deposits. Sterling M3 wasthe aggre-
gate targetedafter 1976, though after1980 the authoritiesclaimed to































Nixon on August 15, 1971, which among other things
led to thefloating of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange
markets. The pound floated from August 23, 1971, was
repegged following the Smithsonian Agreement of De-
cember, but floated again on June 23, 1972, after a run
on reserves. The float, which wasintroduced as atem-
porary measure, has continued ever since.
The expansionary policies weie successful for a
short time. tndusti-ial production rose 7 percent in
1973 and unemployment fell fr-om 3.7 percent in 1972
to 2.6 percent in 1973 and 1974 (chart 1). Investment,
however, did not rise significantly and the boom was
short-lived. The oil crisis combined with asharp rever-
sal in monetary policy to bring the expansion to an
end. By1975, industrial production wasback to its 1970
level.
During this time, however, inflation accelerated,
reaching 25 percent per year in 1975. Some blamed the







was the money stock increases of 1972—73 (see chart 3).
As a result ofthis extremely fast money growth, infla-
tion in Britain went much higher than in other indus-
trial countries. In the United States,for example, it was
about 11 percent in 1974 and about 9 percent in 1975.
A Tightening of the “Corset”
The reversal of monetary policy in December 1973
took the form of a return to quantitative ceilings on
deposits. This scheme, which became known as the
“corset,” restricted banks’ ability to compete for in-
terest-bearing time deposits.7 A maximum percentage
growth rate was specified for banks’ interest-bearing
eligible liabilities. Ifa bank exceeded this growth rate, it
was required to place non-interest-bearing Sup-
plementary Deposits” with theBank ofEngland much
7For a retrospective assessment of the corset, see Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin (March 1982), pp. 74—85.
Chart 3
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shaded areas represent recessions, defined as the contraction phase of coincident economic indicators.
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like the Fed’s required reservesb. The corset remained
in forte until June 1980 (apart from two breaks: Febru-
ary28, 1975,to November 18,1976, and August 11, 1977,
to June 8, 1978).
The upsurge of inflation became a major political
concern. A voluntary wage restraint policy was intro-
duced in mid-1975, and a commitment was made that
money supply growth would cease to be a source of
inflationary pressure in the economy.A target range for’
the growth rate of sterling M3 was introduced in 1976
bythe LabourChancellor Dennis Healey.5 The practice
of announcing targets has continued to date. The
targets have generally been achieved except inperiods
following relaxation of the corset.
While the inflationary monetary expansion of 1971—
73 was moderated after the end of 1973, the fiscal
deficit got bigger. From a financial surplus in 1970,
public sectorfinances deteriorated to aposition where
in 1975 public sectorborrowing exceeded loper-cent of
GM’. This was partlydue to the policies introduced by
the Heath government, but also to the efforts of the
subsequent Labour government, elected in February
1974,to hold down nationalized industry prices as well
as those of some foods. This involved increased sub-
sidies.” The argument, initially accepted in official cir-
cles, was that an increased budget deficit represented
an appropriate offset to the impact of the oil price rise.
By 1976, the size ofthe budget deficit had become a
major public issue. A crisis was triggered by asubstan-
tial fall in the value of the pound. An application was
made to the International Monetary Fund IIMF for a
loan to increase foreign exchange reserves. Why this
was necessary is not clear, since the pound was float-
ing, but the government introduced amajor package of
public spending cuts in order to meet IMF conditions
for the loan. While current government expenditures
on goods and services were held back to a noticeable
degree, the major impact of the cuts was in public
sector- investment programs (see chart 4).
Despite the tightening offiscal policy after 1976, the
economy exhibited moderately strong real growth
through 1979. Growth rates ofrealGriP gross domestic
product which is gross national product less net in-
come from abroad) were in the 2 percent to 3 percent
range. The expansion was aided somewhat by a tem-
81t was first announced that money growth would henceforth be
noninflationary. A forecastfor sterling MS was then released. Only
later didthe forecast form the basis of a target range.
9Afurther problemwascreatedby the factthat up to 1975 government
expenditures were planned in real terms. Whenprices rose, nominal
expenditurewasincreased to compensate. Subsequently,cash lim-
its were introduced for public spending.
porary relaxation ofmonetary policy inthe second half
of 1977 and first half of 1978. Partly this expansion
resulted from the removal of the corset; it also was
induced, however, by substantial foreign exchange in-
tervention to stop the pound from appreciating. U.K.
foreign exchange reserves rose from $34 billion at the
end of 1976 to $20.1 billion by the end of 1977. This
intervention was clearly reflected in the rapid growth
of Ml (see chart 3)10
POLICY CHANGES OF THE
THATCHER GOVERNMENT
Whereas the 1970—74 Conservative government of
Edward Heath had embarked on amoney growth and
public spending-led boom, Mrs. Thatcher came to
power in 1979 committed to a very different strategy.
The Thatcher government had two major goals. One
goal was to reduce the level of public spending, in
order to both eliminate the budget deficit and facilitate
lower levels oftaxation. This would reverse the alleged
crowding out of private sector activity by the public
sector and would restore the incentives necessary for
industrial growth. Second, inflation was to be
squeezed out ofthe economy by agradual reduction of
the rate of growth of the money stock.11
In June 1979, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mrs. Thatcher’s
Chancellor of the Exchequer for her first government
(May 1979—June 1983), introduced a budget that low-
ered personal direct taxes and raised indirect taxes.
The budget also included arise in the tax on North Sea
oil producers. Planned public expenditures were cut.
‘the target range for the growth rate ofsterling M3 was
set at 7—11 percent, only 1 percent lower than that set
by the previous Labourgovernment. At the same time,
however, the Bank of England’s Minimum Lending
Rate (MLII) was raised from 12 percent to 14 percent
(and later raised to 17 percent in November).12
The June 1979 policy changes were intended to re-
duce inflation, which had begun to rise again in 1979.
This macroeconomic policy strategy wasformalized in
10This experience with inten’ention did much to convince the author-
ities that holdingdown thevalue of thepound without generatinga
rapid rise in the money supply was impossible.
‘1The intentionof eliminating inflationsolely by monetarypolicyrather
than incomes policies was one reason why Mrs. Thatcher earned
the monetarist label. Thenature ofmonetarism is outlined in Batten
and Stone (1983). For adiscussionof how views about macroeco-
nomic policy had changed overtime both in Britain and the United
States. see Alt and Chrystal (1983).
2
Bank Rate was renamed Minimum Lending Rate in 1971. It was
intended to be related to market rates, though from time to time it
was still used as a policy instrument. See Hall.
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Chart 4
Government Transfers, Consumption and Investment
as a Percent of GDP
the March 1980 budget into aso-called Medium Term
Financial Strategy (MTFS(,which involved planned re-
ductions in public spending over a four- or- five-year
horizon to reduce the budget deficit as a proportion of
GriP. Reductions in tax rates also were considered.
Monetary growth targets were to be reduced gradually
over the same period, though there was no change in
the r-ange for- 198O/81.’~
The MTFS was effectively abandoned almost im-
mediately. The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
target for 1980/81, set in the March budget, was £8½
billion. By November- 1980, the fot-ecast was revised
upwar-d to £11½billion. The expansion of public
spending was due partly to high wage settlements in
the public sector and partly to an unexpected rise
11Budgetsarenormallysubmitted in March. They applyforthefollow-
ing financialyearwhich runs April to April.Theconventionused here
is that 1980/81 refers to the financial year April 1980 to April 1981.
in unemployment.” ‘the abandonment ofthe corset in
June 1980 led to growth rates of sterling M3 well in
excess of the upper target level.’5
While Mrs.’l’hatcher intended to cut both taxes and
public spending, the opposite generally has occurred.
“The previous Labour government had set up a Pay Comparability
Commission to inquire into public sector pay. This commission
recommendedsubstantial pay raisesformanygroups. Mrs.Thatch-
er honoredthese recommendationsbefore winding up thecommis-
sion and substituting a public sector pay norm.”
‘tBuiterand Miller (1981)argued that monetarypolicy in Britain was
too tight and resulted in an excessive appreciation of sterling. In
Buiter and Miller (1983), however, they admit that the evidence is
not consistent with a monetary overshooting hypothesis. Indeed,
they express concern for the credibility of a monetary policy that
frequently exceeded targets. Since 1979, sterling MS growth has
consistently exceeded the inflation rate. Ml growth looks more
restrictive, though this also is distorted by the endingof the corset.
The freeing of banks to compete for time deposits led to a switch
from checking accountsto time deposits. This substitution is volun-
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Chart 5
Government Tax Revenues as a Percent of GDP




Tax revenue, for example, grewas aproportion ofGriP
until late 1982 (chart 51.’” Similarly, both real govern-
mnent consumption (cun’ent spending on goods and
services) and real transfer pawnents have risen as a
proportion of GDP since 1979 (chart 41. The major ex-
ception on the expenditure side is government invest-
ment (chart 4), which was cut until mid-1982. The cuts
achieved in this category by theThatcher government,
however, were much smaller than those introduced by
the previous Labour government.
ARE POLICY CHANGES PRIMARILY
RESPONSIBLE?
It is hard to look at what happened in Britain after
1979 and be comfortable with the story that policy
leRevenue from taxes on North Sea oil producers has contributed
significantly to this. In 1978, the yield on Petroleum Revenue Tax
was closeto zero. In 1983, thetaxes on North Sea oil yielded £6.1
billion which was 13.5 percent of total tax revenue.
changes made by the Thatcher-government are entire-
ly responsible. We already have seen that unemplov-
ment in 1983 reached a level well over double that
associated ‘with the 1973—75 recession. Yet monetary
policy was probably no tighter in the Thatcher years
than in the previous recession.
Fiscal policy, if anything, was tighter in the 1975—78
period than in the first three years of the Thatcher
government. Table 1 presents the change in budget
deficit as a proportion of GDP. ‘the fir-st column is
based on unadjusted figures. Tile second column
attempts to identily changes due to discretionary poli-
cy rather than cyclical factors. It also weights the tax
and expenditure changes according to their-impact on
demand. An allowance for the fact that some taxes
came from oil, which would have adifferent impact on
demand from, say, personal income taxes, is therefore
included in this measure; thus, it provides a better
indicator offiscalpolicy stance. Negative figures reflect
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What emerges from these figures is that fiscal policy
was mildly restraining in 1979/80 and 1980/81. It was
tighter in 1981/82, but has been more or less neutral
since then. It is noticeable, however, that the fiscal
policy of the Thatcher government has been /ess re-
strictive than that of the previous Labour-government
in thethree financial year-s1975/76 to 1977/78, when the
cumulative fall in the deficit as a percent of GriP
(weighted and cyclically adjusted) amounted to 4.7
percentage points. The fail under Mrs. Thatcher in the
three years 1979/80 through 1981/82 totaled only 3.2
percentage points.
WAS THE WORLD RECESSION
PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE?
Britain’s economy exports about 25 percent of its
GDP. It is conceivable that a decline in world demand
could reduce the demand forBritish exports enough to
cause a contraction of manufacturing production. No
doubt the worldwide recession of the early 1980s is
partly to blame; however, it does not seem to be the
main event: the decline in manufacturing in Britain
preceded the world recession by several months.
Table 2 shows that world trade in manufactured
goods grew strongly through 1980, slowed in 1981, then
declined marginally in 1982. The decline in sales of
British manufactured goods, however, dates from 1979







largelycomplete bythe end of1980.” In both 1979 and
1980, world trade inmanufactured goods rose strongly.
The figures for industrial production tell a similar
story: Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD( industrial production rose strongly
in 1979, leveled off in 1980 and 1981 and declined in
1982. British industrial production fell about twoyears
before the fall in the OECD figure, and by a consider-
ably larger amount.’8
Before 1976, unemployment in Britain had typically
been below the OECD average. From 1976 through
1979, Britain’s unemployment rate was a little higher,
but followed a similar pattern to the OECD aver-age.
Since 1979, Britain’s unemployment has risen much
further than the OECD average.
Thus, there is no strong case for believing that the
world recession provides an adequate explanation of
the contraction in B,itain in 1980, even when com-
bined with the Thatcher government’s monetary and
fiscal policies. Indeed, the world recession was most
severe in 1982, ayear inwhich Britain’s manufacturing
production actually recovered somewhat.
‘TManufacturers’stocksof unsold outputrosesharply in 1979 indicat-
ing a slump in sales. See National fnstitute Economic Review
(February 1984), p. 11, chartS. Production was subsequently cut
back and stocks run down through 1980.
lelndustrial production is a broaderaggregate thanmanufacturing, it
includes oil production among otherthings.
34FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1954
chart o













THE NORTH SEA OIL EXPLANATION
The emergence of Britain as a major oil producer
provides an explanation of some of the changes that
occurred in the British economy over the past five
years.’°Up to mid-1976, Britain was entirely dependent
upon imported oil; in 1980, Britain became a net ex-
porter ofoil. Following such a structural change in the
supply side of the economy, the trade balance in
manufactured goods,according to theory, would move
in theopposite direction of theoil balance.2°The force
‘9Some commentators such as Buiter and Miller (1981. 1983),
Niehans (1981) and Darbyand Lothian (1983) have dismissedthe
effects of North Sea oil. However, Forsyth and Kay (1980) argued
that oilproduction wouldleadto a sizablecontraction in manufactur-
ing. Bond and KnabI (1982), Laney (1982) and McGuirk (1983) all
provide evidence that oil has substantially worsened the competi-
tiveness of U.K. manutacturing. See Bank of England Quarter4’
Bulletin (1982), pp. 56—73, for a description of North Sea oil re-
sources.
°°See, for example, Corden and Neary (1982).
that brings this about is an appreciation of the ex-
change rate, which raises the price of domestic manu-
factured goods relativeto overseas competitors’ prices.
Consequently, domestic consumers buy a higherpro-
portion offoreign-produced goods, and foreigners buy
relativelyfewer domestic-manufactured exports.Thus,
the manufacturing sector contracts.2’
Chart 6 shows the oil trade balance and the manu-
facturing trade balance. Chart 7 shows the dollar-
pound exchange rate and the relative wholesale price
of British manufactured goods compared with other
“Strictlyspeaking, this contractionneed only be relativeto the rest of
the economy. Whathasto be explained is theswitching ofspending
from home-produced to foreign-producedmanufactured goods.Our
claim is thatthis was largely a relative price effectresultingfromthe
oil-related decline of competitiveness of British manufacturing.
Thereare relative price effects among inputs as well asoutputs. A
rise in realwages hascaused manufacturersto economizeon labor
for given output levels. Output per personemployed in U.K. manu-
facturing rose 15 percent between the end of 1980 and mid-1983.
Thus, thedecline in employment in manufacturing has beengreater
than the output loss alone would have led to.
1970 71 12 73 74 75 76 17 78 79 80 81 82 83 1984
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chart 2’
Dollar/Pound Exchange Rate and Relative Wholesale Prices
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 1983
Source: International Finan cia’ Statistics, International Monetary Fund
lj Data are averages of daily figures.








industrial countries.22 Until 1973, there was a small
surplus in manufactur-ed trade and asmall deficitin oil
trade. Asthe oil deficit grew, so did the manufactured
goods export surplus. From 111/1976 on, the oil deficit
ster-ling appreciated further, however-, relative demand
for British and foreign goods shifted far enough to
compensate for the relative rise in price of British
goods. After mid-1977, the surplus in manufactured
shrank, and was eliminated in 1980. By 1/1984, there
was a substantial oil surplus.
The manufacturing surplus initially continued to
increase as the pound appreciated after 1976.23 As
22Niehans, and Darby and Lothian argue that the appreciation of
sterlingwasdue to slow base money growth in the early yearsof the
Thatcher government. This is implausible. Why, for example, was
sterling appreciating for two years before Mrs. Thatcher came to
power, and why did it depreciate in 1981 when base growth con-
tinued to slow?Noneof the monetaryexplanations ofthe exchange
rate can explain asustainedrise in relativegoods prices overalong
period oftime, suchasthatevident in chart7. Such changes require
structural explanation such as is offered by North Sea oil. Many
commentators presumed that monetary policy was tight simply
because sterling was appreciating. Laney offers evidence that
monetaryexplanations of the U.K. exchange rate brokedown after
1977. The price of oil is animportant explanatoryvariable afterthat
date. He alsoshowsthat othernew oilproducers have had compa-
rable experiences. Thus, the event ofsignificance in 1979 may not
bethe election of Mrs.Thatcher butrather the risein the price of oil.
23Asthecurrency appreciates, thesterling priceof importsfalls. In the
short run, this improvesthe manufacturers’trade balance because
the same volume of imports costs less. However, as spending
patterns adjust to the new relative prices, the volume of exports
starts to fall relative to the volume of imports. Once the volumes
adjust more than the prices, the balance in manufactured goods
startsto decline. This is just the reverse ofthe “J curve” effect of a
devaluation. It arises because demandelasticities are smaller in the
short run than in the long run. Because of this, the exchange rate
may appreciate “too far” in the process of adjusting to the oil
surplus. That is to saythat the rise in the relative price of manufac-
tured goods requiredin equilibrium is less than thatactually experi-
enced during transition. This is consistent with events in Britain
where relative wholesale prices (chart 7) overshot their ultimate
level. This is a different kind of overshooting from that associated
with anunexpected tightening of monetarypolicy analyzedby Dorn-
busch (1976). The appreciation of the exchange rate is brought
about not just by the impact of the changing oil balance on the
current account but also by capital inflows which reinforce the
process. The 1979 oil price rise boosted a process already under
way. McGuirk estimates that a 23 percent fall in competitiveness
was required in equilibrium to adjust the U.K. trade balanceto the
effectsof oil at the 1980 oil prices. At the 1978 priceof oil, this was
only 12 percent. A fall in competitiveness isarisein the relativeprice
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goods fell sharply, until by 1/1984 there was asubstan-
tial deficit in manufactured goods trade, roughly equal
to the oil surplus.
In short, we have an explanation of events in Britain
that requires neither a major contraction in domestic
aggregate expenditure nor a major slump in total
world demand to explain the collapse of manufactur-
ing industry in Britain. The dominant factor was a
major switch in spending patterns resulting from the
nse in relative price of British manufactured goods.
The proportion of domestic demand for these goods
satisfied by imports rose sharply, while exports of
manufactured goods stagnated. The volume of manu-
factur-ed exports was about the same in 1983 as it was
in 1976.Over the same period, the volume ofmanufac-
tured goods imported rose 63 percent.
CONCLUSION
The government of Margaret Thatcher has been
blamed by its critics for causing a major contraction of
activity in Britain by applying monetarist policies.
Without quibbling over whether- those policies were
indeed monetarist, this article argues that the case for
blaming therisein unemployment andthe contraction
of manfuacturing on defiationar aggregate demand
policies is not a strong one, even if one allows for the
impact of the world recession. Rather, the production
and sale of North Seaoil have had abig negative impact
on theBritish manufacturing sector. The production of
oil and the subsequent rise in its price caused an
appreciation of sterling and a rise in the relative price
of British manufactured goods. As a result, British
manufactured goods became uncompetitive and pro-
duction contracted sharply. Thus, it is impossible to
write a balanced history of the British economy over
the last few years without reference to North Sea oil
production.
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